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Digital signature schemes are a fundamental tool for secure distributed systems

It is important to have a formal notion of what a secure digital signature scheme
is	 so that there is a clear interface between designers and users of such schemes

A denition that seemed nal was given by Goldwasser Micali	 and Rivest
in 
 Since then	 however	 several signature schemes with new security prop
erties have been presented	 which are not covered by this denition
 Hence
the new properties were not dened as additions	 but each new type of scheme
needed a new denition from scratch
 This was unsatisfactory

This paper presents an overview of a general denition of digital signature
schemes that covers all these schemes	 and hopefully all that might be invented
in future
 Additional properties of special types of schemes are then presented
in an orthogonal way	 so that existing schemes can be classied systematically

It turns out that signature schemes are best dened by a separation of service	
structure	 and degree of security
 For the service specication	 we use temporal
logic
 Several parts of such a denition can easily be reused for general denitions
of other classes of cryptologic schemes

  Introduction
The purpose of digital signature schemes is to provide message authentication
such that disputes about the authenticity of a message can be settled by third
parties such as courts Digital signature schemes are therefore needed when
ever messages of legal relevance are exchanged over communication networks
and they are also an important tool in distributed secure systems The prop
erty that third parties can settle conicts between the sender and the recipient
is also called nonrepudiation it distinguishes signature schemes from simpler
symmetric authentication schemes
	
As with all securitycritical systems it is important to have a formal def
inition of what a dig ital signature scheme is so that the design and the ap
plication of such schemes can be separated Applications should work with
any digital signature scheme that ful
lls the de
nition without caring about
internal details and designers should know what properties are expected from
their schemes
   Denitions of Ordinary Digital Signatures
Although signature schemes are rather small schemes eg in comparison
with secure operating systems or within cryptology general multiparty com
putation protocols agreeing on a de
nition has not been trivial The 
rst infor
mal de
nition by Diffie and Hellman  saw signature schemes as a form
of encryption schemes used in an inverse way but nowadays many schemes
eg the proposed NIST digital signature standard are not of this form 
Moreover it was originally overlooked that attackers might try to compute
new signatures from given signatures in particular with RSA  	 Hence
it was very satisfactory that a seemingly 
nal de
nition was given in 	 It
allows the scheme to consist of an arbitrary key generation algorithm gen an
arbitrary signing algorithm sign and an arbitrary test algorithm test where
gen and sign are probabilistic and test is usually required to be deterministic
see Figure 
Figure   Components of a signature scheme in the GMR de
nition and their
use The algorithms gen and sign are probabilistic sk pk is a pair of a secret
and a public key m a message sig a signature and i represents the number of
messages signed so far
Moreover a strong security de
nition covering all conceivable behaviors of an
attacker was given The attacker may 
rst repeatedly ask the signer to sign a
message adaptive chosenmessage attack and then the attacker is said to be
successful if he can produce any additional signed message existential forgery

The GMR de
nition is important in practice even though most schemes in
actual use cannot be proved secure with respect to it They are all designed
so that one can at least hope that they ful
ll it For instance one does not
use pure RSA in practice but includes hash functions or redundancy to
counter the abovementioned attacks see the ISO standardization activities or
the proposed NIST digital signature standard    Note that hash
functions or redundancy have to be considered parts of the signature scheme
if one wants to provide a common interface to applications Moreover note
that an unrestricted chosenmessage attack where the signer signs anything
the attacker tells her to seems a bit excessive but no restricted form is known
where one is fairly sure to be on the safe side It is unlikely that a signer will
sign any message but what message could one be sure she would not sign
Hence one really takes measures against the general attack in practice
  Constructions of Ordinary Digital Signature Schemes
It would exceed the scope of this paper to give an overview of the constructions
of ordinary digital schemes
However we can briey survey the schemes whose security has been proved
under reasonable cryptographic assumptions The 
rst one was presented in
	 with eciency improvements in  For an implementation see  The
necessary assumptions were successively weakened in    Recently
eorts have been made to improve the eciency in  with an incomplete
proof and   Note however that failstop signature schemes see be
low also yield provably secure ordinary digital signature schemes see  
and thus the 
rst ecient provably secure scheme based on discrete logarithms
was 
  New Schemes
Just when this satisfactory state with a generally accepted de
nition was
reached new types of signature schemes with new security properties came
up
  With failstop signature schemes a signer who has been cheated with a
forged signature can prove that it was a forgery  	   
 
  With socalled undeniable signature schemes    the recipient of
a signature cannot show it around eg to his friends without the signers
help Because of this property these schemes might rather be called in
visible as not being deniable is common to all types of signatures The
invisibility property is useful if it should be private what messages the
users sign However if a signer is forced to either acknowledge or deny a
signature eg in court she cannot falsely deny her real signatures
  There are even unconditionally secure signature schemes where even an
attacker with unlimited computing power cannot produce forgeries better

than by using a random number and hoping that it is the signature  
However unconditionally secure signature schemes seem to be impractical
in contrast to failstop and undeniable ones
All these new schemes exist in several variants with dierent properties For
instance failstop signature schemes can be more ecient if all the signatures
of one signer have the same recipient Such a scheme could be applied in
a payment system where clients only sign money trans fer orders for their
bank Another example is that the original unconditionally secure schemes did
not enable recipients to transfer signatures from one to another which one
tacitly takes for granted with most other digital signature schemes but one
can reintroduce this property in a limited way A third example is undeniable
signature schemes where signers can unconditionally deny forged signatures
which is a slightly restricted failstop property  see the de
nition of dual
security in Section 
This situation alone might call for some classi
cation However it would
not be too bad if all these schemes were signature schemes in the sense of
the GMR de
nition with some additional properties However none of them
is because they all dier somehow in their structure ie in the number of
algorithms and their parameters for instance
  In failstop signature schemes the recipients or a center trusted by them
must take part in key generation so that they can be protected from the
signer falsely proving her own signatures to be forgeries
  Undeniable signature schemes do not have a test algorithm in the usual
sense but an interactive protocol usually a zeroknowledge proof where
the signer proves the correctness of the signature to the recipient
  In both failstop and undeniable signature schemes a third party cannot
simply test a signature presented by a recipient but must also ask the
signer so that the signer has a chance to produce a proof of forgery or to
carry out a disavowal protocol respectively
  In unconditionally secure signature schemes there is no public key in the
usual sense instead everybody obtains a dierent test key in a complicated
key generation protocol
Not even all the signature schemes that are supposed to be ordinary ie that
have no special new features are covered by the GMR de
nition Sometimes
signing is not only an algorithm with the inputs skm and i but some memory
is needed between executions eg in Schnorrs scheme with preprocessing 
In another example there is a trusted public random value in addition to the
public keys 
  Goals of Denition and Classication
So what does one do with all these new types of schemes

Even if each one had a new de
nition which some do but most variants
dont the situation would be unsatisfactory First if they are all called sig
nature schemes a fact that nobody seems to challenge they ought to have
something in common Secondly new de
nitions in cryptology are just as
errorprone as new schemes hence one should have as few de
nitions as possi
ble and evaluate them carefully
Hence the properties common to all signature schemes should be stated
clearly once and for all Special properties should be formulated as additions
to this general de
nition Applications then know what to expect from all
signature schemes or can list the additional properties they need Such a
de
nition is given in this paper
  Scope
The scope of signature schemes actually de
ned here is schemes that could be
used in the place of handwritten signatures in law ie where each signer has
complete control over what she signs This excludes blind and group signature
schemes eg  and  	  their services are too dierent for a nice joint
de
nition For similar reasons we have excluded schemes that need additional
parties eg identity	based schemes  and schemes with speci
c helpers for
the signature veri
cation   The general parts of the de
nition and
classi
cation however could be applied to those schemes too and specifying
the exact services of such schemes in our framework would be very useful future
work
 The Main Ideas
Intuitively what all signature schemes have in common is exactly what was
written in the very 
rst sentence They provide message authentication such
that disputes about the authenticity of messages can be settled by third parties
However as sketched above they have dierent degrees of security such as
failstop and their structure varies widely All existing de
nitions of digital
signature schemes specify what disputable message authentication means only
in terms of one given structure and with one particular degree of security This
is why the whole de
nition had to be changed whenever the structure was
modi
ed or a dierent degree of security was introduced
The basic idea to obtain a general de
nition is therefore to separate the
following three aspects
  Service
 Here we de
ne the minimal service of all signature schemes in
an ideal way ideal means independent of the structure and the degree of
security We do this in a normal speci
cation language ie one which is
not speci
c to cryptology We chose temporal logic but other languages
with the same expressive power could be used as well
  Structure
 Here we de
ne a very general structure common to all signature
schemes

  Degree of security
 Here we de
ne what it means that any scheme provides
any service with a certain degree of security In other words we de
ne a
speci
c cryptologic semantics for the normal speci
cation language
Given such a general de
nition one can classify particular types of signature
schemes according to
  additional service properties
  special simpler cases of the structure and
  the actual degree of security
An additional advantage of such a modular de
nition is that only the service is
speci
c to signature schemes whereas the structural aspects and the degrees of
security can be reused with other schemes that still lack general de
nitions eg
digital payment schemes Note however that only integrity and availability
requirements can be expressed in temporal logic not privacy For an overview
of how this approach can be extended to include privacy see 
The service both the minimal requirements used to de
ne the notion of a
signature scheme and additional properties is considered in Section  Sections
 and  treat structure and degree of security The parts that are common to
much more general schemes than signature schemes can only be sketched here
 Related Work
There are two somewhat related wellknown approaches at general and abstract
de
nitions of cryptologic schemes de
nitions of secure multiparty computa
tion protocols from theoretical cryptology and logics of authentication in par
ticular BAN logic from the design of protocols using cryptologic primitives
For interested readers the relations and dierences to these approaches are now
discussed No knowledge of these approaches is assumed in the later sections
  Relation to Secure Multi	Party Computation Protocols
Deriving a cryptologic de
nition from an ideal service speci
cation is new with
signature schemes but it is known with multiparty function computation
starting with  Overviews can be found in  	  However existing
de
nitions were not general enough to be used for signature schemes This is
no criticism  they go much further in other directions in particular de
nitions
of privacy The following new features were needed
  Logic specication The services provided by dierent types of signature
schemes are similar but not identical In multiparty function computa
tion however the speci
cation is given by exactly one ideal trusted host
which has to be simulated very closely by the actual distributed cryptologic
protocol Here a speci
cation expressing individual requirements is used
instead Hence we can formulate some minimal requirements that have
to be ful
lled by all signature schemes and add further requirements to

specify particular types of schemes Actually not even individual types of
signature schemes eg the ordinary ones according to the GMR de
nition
simulate one ideal trusted host
  Reactive systems Current formal de
nitions of multiparty protocols only
treat the computation of functions Each user of such a system makes
one initial input and obtains one output at the end Signature schemes
however yield reactive systems They can go on polynomially forever
and at any time users can decide what messages they want to sign or what
disputes to carry out An informal sketch of more general games exists in
 if they were formalized they might be nearer to signature schemes
in this respect In  a speci
c phase protocol is formally de
ned by
requiring each phase to securely evaluate a certain function However this
makes the internal state between the two stages an explicit output whereas
we want to abstract from the internal state
  Varying connections Usual multiparty protocols assume 
xed connections
throughout a protocol run usually reliable pointtopoint channels between
each pair of participantsand often reliable broadcast channels With sig
nature schemes the connections and their security can vary as a function
of time Neither do the participants which may be handheld computers
in pockets have so many dedicated channels nor are the channels secure
except for the broadcast channel during initialization  this is part of the
reason to use signatures
 Relation to BAN Logic
Logic speci
cation of signature schemes may sound rather similar to the logics
of authentication from  and many successive papers However there are
several dierences in the purpose and consequently in the approach This
is natural because these logics were primarily designed to 
nd errors in key
exchange protocols with symmetric cryptosystems which they do successfully
  Logics of authentication are used to specify and prove protocols using cryp
tologic primitives whereas here the signature schemes themselves are to
be speci
ed
  Logics of authentication assume very simple cryptologic primitives hence
they deal with individual algorithms and keys of those schemes Hence a
new type of logic would be needed for each new type of signature scheme
precisely as with current cryptologic de
nitions Usually eg in  in
tegrity is still assumed to be provided by a variant of an encryption scheme
a structure that most signature schemes do not have A more general ab
straction would use the algorithms from the GMR de
nition see Figure

  If logics of authentication have a formal semantics not the real cryptologic
schemes are used but algebraic abstractions   Hence if one 
nds
an error with the logic there was an error in the real protocol but if one

proves the algebraic abstraction to be secure one is not sure that the real
protocol is secure too Here the real signature schemes are the semantics
An approach more similar to ours was taken in  where requirements on
the schemes usually treated with BAN logic were also formulated independently
of the structure and in temporal logic The semantics is algebraic abstractions
as above The general type of requirements is very similar except that 
has no explicit interface as ours below Introducing one might be helpful there
too because intuition seems to be needed to map eg an accept statement
from the requirements to something in the actual protocol whereas here it
is the interface output of the protocol We also found a separation of system
entities and users helpful because entities have prescribed programs and users
do not
For an overview of other related approaches see 
In future the approaches might meet in logics for the design of complicated
protocols but using more general primitives and a real cryptologic semantics
 Service Specification of Signature Schemes
We now give a logic speci
cation of the service of all digital signature schemes
  What is Specied
To achieve the desired independence of structural dierences we regard the
whole signature scheme as one system whose behavior at the interface to its
users is speci
ed see Figure  More precisely this system is an instantiation
of the scheme see Section  Specifying interface behaviour is normal in
the 
eld of distributed systems eg  but not in cryptology
Figure  A system and its interface The service to be speci
ed is the set of
permitted sequences of interface events
In our case the entities correspond to processes running on the behalf of indi
vidual users For instance if the signature scheme is implemented in handheld
computers used by individuals an entity roughly corresponds to the processes
on such a computer The users of the signature scheme are in the environment
hence they are not modeled explicitly but intuitively one can assume that
each access point is owned by a particular user This becomes more important
when degrees of security are modeled below and users are regarded as mutually
distrusting

 Overview of the Interface Events
So what are the interface events of a signature scheme ie what are the users
concerned with and not only the entities inside the system Informally the
users need the system to perform at least three types of socalled transactions
each consisting of a few related interface events at several access points
  Authentication Any two users called a signer and a recipient can au
thenticate a message The signer inputs which message is authenticated
The recipient has to know the message too and the identity of the signer
who is supposedly authenticating it At the end the system must give the
recipient a Boolean output indicating whether the message was accepted as
authenticated or not
  Disputes In a dispute the third party trying to settle it and the recipient
who claims to have the authenticated message take part and sometimes
the supposed signer too As in authentication the users have to input the
message that is disputed and the identity of the signer who is supposed
to have authenticated it and the third party obtains a Boolean output
indicating whether the message was accepted as authenticated or not
  Initialization For technical reasons initialization is needed It corresponds
to key generation and distribution inside the system but the users only
need to know the identity of the future signer for whom this is happening
and whether initialization was successful All users should take part in
initialization
We call these the minimal transactions of a signature scheme because every
scheme must oer them Speci
c schemes may oer more
Note that the interface events only deal with messages identities and
Boolean values denoting if something was accepted or not  signatures and
keys are hidden inside the system
 Interface Events in Detail
More formally the domain of the interface events are de
ned as follows Each
event is represented as a triple
identity direction value
where identity denotes the access point where the event occurs direction  
fin outg denotes whether it is an input or an output event and value is the
value passed through the access point The domain of identity is a set Id 
Id
S
 Id
R
 Id
T
 ie separate access points are used when acting as a signer
recipient or third party
The domains of value are a bit more complicated than sketched in Section
 For the minimal transactions they are shown in Table  The individual
parameters of the values have the following meaning
  Each input value starts with a string such as sign that characterizes the
type of action wanted

  m denotes a message from a message space M 
  id
S
denotes an identity of a signer ie an element of Id
S

  ids
R
is a description of a set of recipients The domain of such a parameter
may be an arbitrary subset of the power set of Id
R
 These parameters
are needed because inside some signature schemes signing depends on the
identities of the intended recipients The empty string  is used as the de
scription of the complete set ie for no restriction  this is the standard
case
Table   Interface events and their parameters Those that would also be
needed if only ordinary digital signature schemes were speci
ed are in bold
face
  The two output values acc in bold face denote if a message was accepted
as authenticat ed Disputes in some schemes may have results other than
Boolean hence a domain Disputeresults  ftrue falseg is permitted
The two most important cases are
 acc  broken in failstop signature schemes means that a valid proof
of forgery has been produced in the system and thus the users can no
longer rely on this system
 acc  not	cooperated in undeniable signature schemes means that the
signer refuses to cooperate and no decision can be reached in the sys
tem The users outside the system must decide what to do with non
cooperating signers under which circumstances
In initialization acc denotes whether this initialization was successful at
all ie whether it is now possible to authenticate messages under id
S

  The outputs eot are usually only needed to indicate that the transaction
has ended
  The parameters ids
in
in initialization denote which access points and thus
users are supposed to take part and ids
out
denotes which of them actually
took part successfully This is needed to cover schemes with interactive key
generation where disrupters have to be excluded

  N is a message bound from a set Bounds  N  fg ie the number of
messages the signer can authenticate at this access point after this initial
ization
Note that the signer does not input her own identity during authentication
 it is implicit in the access point she uses usually in the form of a secret
key stored in the entity serving the access point Restricting the access to the
access point and thus the usage of the key is not the business of the signature
scheme but eg of password protection Moreover a service where one could
input any identity at any access point would be insecure as anyone could input
the identity of anyone else Similarly the signer does not input her identity
in initialization In that case it is usually present in the entity in the form of
access to a broadcast channel under this identity so that the generated key can
be distributed under the identity
 Specication and System Parameters
The domains of interface events had some parameters such as a message space
M  Hence there is a whole family of speci
cations Spec
pars
 where pars denotes
the tuple of these parameters They will be treated in two dierent ways
  Specication parameters Almost all parameters can be 
xed by the de
signer of a concrete signature scheme This makes the de
nition very gen
eral
Hence there may be signature schemes for any message space M  say with
M  f g
 
 any set Bounds  Nfg of message bounds any countable
set Dispute	results  ftrue falseg and a few more parameters In par
ticular there is a predicate suitable Id
R
 ids
out
 ids
R
 that describes which
sets of identities ids
R
 are suitable inputs by the third party in a dispute
if Id
R
is the set of all identities and ids
out
that of successful participants
in the corresponding initialization
The tuple of all speci
cation parameters is called spec pars
  System parameters The exception is that any signature scheme will have to
work for almost arbitrary sets Id
S
 Id
R
 and Id
T
of identities see Section

 Logic Requirements
The requirements on signature schemes specify what outputs the systems have
to produce depending on previous interface events Hence they are formulas
that describe some sequences of interface events as permitted and others as
forbidden Recall that these requirements are made in an ideal way error
probabilities etc are handled once and for all in the degrees of security
Note that we are lucky that all minimal requirements on signature schemes
only specify what outputs may occur There are neither privacy requirements
nor probability distributions Hence normal temporal logic or other formalisms
	
for describing sets of sequences can be used Of course there will be secret
information inside the systems but this is only the implementation
Each requirement is formulated from the point of view of some interested
parties formally a set of identities It only involves events at the access points
of these parties In Section  such a requirement has to be ful
lled even if all
the other parties are attacking and their entities deviate from the protocol
  Overview of the Minimal Requirements
First an informal and simpli
ed overview of the requirements that all signature
schemes must ful
ll is given
  Requirement of the recipient on disputes Once a recipient has accepted a
certain messagem as authenticated by a certain signer id
S
 ie he made an
input test
 
m id
S
 and the output was acc  true the message should
also be accepted by any third party in a dispute ie the third partys
output acc should be true To include schemes like undeniable signature
schemes it must be tolerated that the output is not	cooperated instead
The interested parties are the recipient and the third party who settles the
dispute Note that the whole requirement is formulated from their point of
view No event at the signers access point is mentioned Informally only
the recipient might be called interested but the requirement presupposes
that the third party is honest and it can only be ful
lled if the third partys
entity is correct
  Requirement of the signer on disputes As long as a signer has not authen
ticated a certain messagem ie she has not input sign
 
m ids
R
 for any
ids
R
 a third party should not accept that she did ie the third partys
output acc in a dispute should be false at least if the signer disavows the
message in this dispute The interested parties are the signer and the third
party
  Eectiveness of authentication If a signer and a recipient make consistent
inputs to start authentication ie with the same message and identities
the message should be accepted ie the recipient should obtain the output
acc  true
  Eectiveness and correctness of initialization If an initialization is started
and at least the future signer and one further participant are interested it
should end successfully ie with acc  true Moreover the outputs acc
and ids
out
denoting whether it worked at all and with whom should be
consistent among any set of interested parties and nobody who took part
correctly should be missing from ids
out

  Availability of service Any authentication dispute or initialization should
end within reasonable time so that new inputs are accepted at the same
access point The interested party is only the owner of the access point
One may miss unforgeability in this list ie if a signer has not authenticated a
certain message a recipient should not accept that she did However one can

show that this is a consequence of the other requirements with one exception
of only technical interest 
The complete formalization of the requirements exceeds the scope of this
paper However some general details and one example are presented
 Some Details
First one has to decide to what extent honest users are assumed to behave
reasonably For the general de
nition we want minimal requirements on the
system and thus strong preconditions about the users In particular the min
imal requirements have preconditions that initialization with the correct inter
face events at the access points of the interested parties has been performed
before any other transaction for the same identity id
S
of a signer More user
friendliness eg error messages in other cases can be added as additional
service properties
Secondly varying connections have to be handled see Section  For
instance the requirement of the recipient on disputes can only be ful
lled
if the entities of the recipient and the third party are connected during the
dispute eg so that a signature can be forwarded inside the system but no
precondition about the connections during authentication is needed Hence
the necessity of connections has to be speci
ed in the requirements For this
a variable connections is introduced that contains at each point in time the
current connections It can be visualized as an additional access point where all
the connections are controlled For generality each connection is expressed as a
pair transaction	type identity	set The mapping channel	types that says what
channels eg reliable pointtopoint or broadcast are actually established
between these identities in such a transaction is an additional speci
cation
parameter Only pointtopoint channels are permitted in authentication and
disputes whereas broadcast channels can be used in initialization
Thirdly a model of time is needed At present a simple synchronous model
is used In each round inputs can be made at any number of access points
and then outputs at some access points may occur This may be extended in
future
Finally it is assumed for simplicity that users who carry out a transaction
together start it synchronously This is without much loss of generality because
the users must at least be moderately synchronized in reality too and synchro
nization is not really a task of the signature scheme Moreover for simplicity
we permit only one transaction at each access point at a given time whereas
transactions at dierent access points may overlap so that the entities of the
signature scheme need not bother with scheduling
 Example of the Formalization
The requirement of the recipient on disputes is now presented formally but
for readability not from scratch in all details The rest of formalization should
then be fairly clear except for availability of service More details can be found
in 

The exact type of temporal logic we use is de
ned in  We give an
informal explanation of each formula and write the operators with their names
such as since instead of their symbols so that readers unfamiliar with temporal
logic can guess what is meant We de
ne one abbreviation
f modified since g  g  previous f since f 	 g
ie f is no longer required to hold in the current round but must already have
started in the round where g held
The set of events at the user interface in each round is denoted by a variable
events Thus the requirements deal with the sequence of the values of the two
variables events and connections
Basic predicates about transactions An input is valid if no other transaction is
currently being executed at the same access point ie no other input has been
made there since the last output or since the system start This form of since
is precisely what the operator backto expresses Hence we de
ne
valid inputid value  id in value   events
	 weak previous 
 input atid back to output atid
where
input atid   value
 
 id in value
 
   events
output atid   value
 
 id out value
 
   events
The operator weak previous like previous denotes that something hap
pened in the previous round but it evaluates to true in the very 
rst round
Similarly if an output is considered the value value of the previous valid
input at the same access point ie the user input on which the system is
currently reacting is characterized by
previous valid inputid value 

 output atid modified since valid inputid value
Finally we de
ne that no output occurs at a set of access points usually an
interest group
no output atinterest group  id   interest group  
output atid
Simple predicates about accepting and disputes We 
rst de
ne that a recipient
id
R
accepts a message m as authenticated by a signer id
S

recipient acceptsid
R
 m id
S
  id
R
 out true  events
	 previous valid inputid
R
 test
 
 m id
S

The next predicate denotes that a recipient id
R
and a third party id
T
start a

dispute about the messagem consistently and with a certain parameter ids
R

shows toid
R
 id
T
 m id
S
 ids
R
  valid inputid
R
 show
 
 m id
S

	 valid inputid
T
 decide
 
 m id
S
 ids
R

The desired results of such a dispute in the interest of the recipient id
R
and the
third party id
T
 are modeled next the word weakly stands for the possibility
of the output not cooperated
recipient weakly winsid
R
 id
T
  id
T
 outtrue  events
 id
T
 out not cooperated
 
   events
	  eot  id
R
 out eot   events
Sketch of connections and initialization For readability similar de
nitions of
the following predicates are omitted
  correct init usefid
R
 id
T
g id
S
 ids
out
 N which means that the recipient
and the third party have already carried out initialization for id
S
consis
tently and successfully with the message bound N and the output ids
out

and
  second initfid
R
 id
T
g id
S
 which means that the recipient or the third
party try a second initialization for the signer id
S

  properly connecteddispute fid
R
 id
T
g which means that the recipient
and the third party are properly connected for a dispute in the current
round
Assembling the requirement Our last predicate means that if a dispute is
started correctly in the current round and correct connections are provided it
yields the correct result The timing is as follows There should be no other
output until the correct result except that it is no longer speci
ed what the
system does if the connections were wrong in the previous round There is an
exception to the exception however because the result might occur in the very

rst round
recipient can weakly convinceid
R
 id
T
 m id
S
 ids
R
 
shows toid
R
 id
T
 m id
S
 ids
R

 recipient weakly winsid
R
 id
T

 no output atfid
R
 id
T
g
	weak next
no output atfid
R
 id
T
g
unlessrecipient weakly winsid
R
 id
T

previous
 properly connecteddispute
 
 fid
R
 id
T
g
Finally the requirement can be assembled The recipient and the third party

ie the interest group are formal parameters The signer and the message
are quanti
ed universally The requirement says that whenever the recipient
has accepted a message he can from then on convince the third party in the
sense de
ned above provided that both transactions occur in the state cor	
rect init use Recall that the predicate suitable de
ned what parameters ids
R
can be used
Req
rec
id
R
 id
T
 
 id
S
  Id
S
 m   M  ids
out
  PId  N   Bounds
henceforthrecipient acceptsid
R
 m id
S

	 correct init usefid
R
 id
T
g id
S
 ids
out
 N
next ids
R

suitableId
R
 ids
out
 ids
R
 	 id
R
  ids
R
 
recipient can weakly convinceid
R
 id
T
 m id
S
 ids
R

unlesssecond initfid
R
 id
T
g id
S

If one considers 
nite time an operator weak next that evaluates to true
in the last round is needed instead of next The second initialization with
the same signer has to be excluded because inside the system it would lead to
keys that do not 
t the old signature Of course one can still perform a new
initialization for the same user eg by adding a time stamp to the identity
 Additional Service Properties
Additional service properties which can be used to classify signature schemes
can be sorted as follows
Stronger requirements ie concretizations where the minimal speci
cation is
ambiguous The following types exist in actual schemes
  Strong requirement of the recipient on disputes The recipient wishes that
any message he has accepted should also be accepted by a third party
in a subsequent dispute Recall that a weaker minimal requirement was
made because of undeniable signature schemes Most signature schemes
however ful
ll the recipients original wish This is formalized by replacing
the predicate recipient weakly wins by a predicate recipient wins that
does not contain the term id
T
 out not cooperated
 
   events
  Strong requirement of the signer on disputes The minimal requirement of
the signer only guarantees her anything if she disavows the message The
corresponding strong requirement omits this precondition In this case one
need not 
nd the signer to carry out a fair dispute
  Medium requirement of the signer on disputes An intermediate form is
that if the signer does not take part in a dispute acc may be false or
not cooperated but not true ie the message is not simply accepted
This is what undeniable signature schemes oer

  User	friendliness ie requirements on the reaction of the system on inputs
that can be regarded as user errors
One can also de
ne directedness of authentication to mean that the authenti
cation is only valid for the intended recipients
Multiple specications As speci
cations can be ful
lled with dierent degrees
of security it can make sense to have more than one speci
cation In particular
one can make strong requirements that will be guaranteed with a low degree
of security and weaker so called fallback requirements that can be guaranteed
with a higher degree of security ie under more circumstances In particular
the strong requirements might only be ful
lled under computational assump
tions but the fallback requirement informationtheoretically
The fail	stop property is the only current example of multiple speci
cations
Informally one 
rst requires that no forgery ever occurs but then if a forgery
occurs nevertheless it should at least be provable In the speci
cation this
means that fallback versions of both requirements on disputes are made where
both the signer and the recipient tolerate that the third partys output may be
broken An additional requirement for the low degree of security is that the
output broken never occurs ie the system is not falsely stopped It is made
in the interest of only the third party in that dispute ie even if the signer
and the recipient collude
Special specication parameters are also a type of concretization where the
minimal speci
cation is ambiguous see Section  Examples are
  Special message spaces
  Special dependencies on recipients For instance if the domain of ids
R
only consists of sets with one element signatures are speci
c to certain
recipients In contrast in most signature schemes ids
R
always has to be
 ie the signer cannot restrict the recipients
Additional transactions ie extensions of the domains of interface events and
corresponding requirements Some existing ones are
  A transaction transfer for a recipient to pass an authenticated message to
a second recipient so that the second recipient is also sure that he can win
disputes This can work over arbitrary chains of recipients or only chains
of 
xed length Most digital signature schemes permit arbitrary transfers
but undeniable ones none at all and dierent versions of unconditionally
secure ones none or only over chains of 
xed length
  If there is a failstop property one usually also has a transaction to transfer
the knowledge that the system has been broken
  There can be more versions of initialization eg one for new recipients to
enter the system later This is easy with ordinary digital signature schemes
but not with unconditionally secure schemes where key generation is in
teractive

One can also consider local transactions such as queries about the status of an
access points and some distributed forms of the three minimal transactions
ie versions with more participants
Privacy requirements The invisibility of undeniable signatures is the only
privacy requirement that has so far been considered with signature schemes
Recall that blind signatures need a separate speci
cation Note that invisi
bility is now an addition to the general de
nition but cannot be formalized in
the same style as the other additional properties
 Structure
As the service of digital signature schemes has been de
ned at an interface one
can consider implementations with arbitrary structure eg even centralized
ones However only decentralized ones are de
ned to be signature schemes
Two people meeting in the desert with their handheld computers should be
able to exchange authenticated messages More precisely
  there must be one entity per access point as in Figure 
  and only the entities under the access points concerned take part in a
transaction
We call this locality
  General Structure
A signature scheme consists of the programs for such entities and the speci

cation parameters see Section  ie
Scheme  spec pars signer program recipient program third party program
The programs are probabilistic polynomialtime interactive algorithms which
must distinguish in and outputs at the user interface and on an arbitrary num
ber of connections The usual formalization in cryptology is interactive Turing
machines Note that these programs contain the real cryptologic algorithms
in contrast to system models used with logics of authentication
A system is an instantiation of a scheme with certain system parameters
sys pars These are the sets of identities Id
S
 Id
R
 Id
T
 and additional security
parameters Given a scheme and the system parameters the actual system is
de
ned as follows There is one entity per identity each running the appropriate
program Each entity has all the system parameters and its own identity as
an initial state The varying connections are handled by one additional entity
called switch that models the network in a simple way Its input is the variable
connections see Section  and it switches these connections according to
the value of the speci
cation parameter channel types
With any precise notion of an interactive algorithm it is clear how global
runs of such a system in interaction with users are de
ned

Note that all the structural dierences mentioned in Section  are nicely
hidden inside this de
nition of a scheme Within a transaction the entities can
carry out an arbitrary number of algorithms or interactive subprotocols and
they can use an arbitrary number of local variables from their memory
 Simpler Structures
Special structural properties are restrictions on the general structure The
most important one is noninteractive authentication in the authentication
transaction only one message is sent from the signers entity to the recipients
entity These are the signature schemes where signatures in the normal sense
exist Generally one can restrict any type of complexity eg the number
of rounds the number of bits exchanged or the storage used and for each
transaction type separately Moreover one can rede
ne notions such as public
keys under certain structural restrictions
	 Security
Security of a scheme with respect to a service speci
cation means that the
systems derived from the scheme only produce sequences of interface events
permitted by the service speci
cation but in contrast to usual program validity
of temporal logic even in the presence of certain attackers and possibly with
small error probabilities
  General Security Denitions
   Access of Attackers to Parts of the System
When a requirement in the interest of certain parties such as one recipient and
one third party is considered only the entities of these parties are assumed to
be correct ie to execute the programs from the scheme Additionally the
channels between them are secure according to the their type  recall that only
connections that are explicitly required to be correct are modeled in the input
connections and its instantiation via channel types
With the minimal requirements on signature schemes all attackers are as
sumed to collude ie all incorrect entities are replaced by one large attacker
entity
  Inuence of Attackers on Honest Users
Sequences of interface events are produced by interaction of the system with
arbitrary users Even honest users who are interested parties may be inuenced
by the attacker eg in the choice of messages they authenticate An impor
tant case is the adaptive chosenmessage attack on a signer discussed in Section
 In more general signature schemes active attacks on recipients and third
parties are also possible and dangerous because all entities may have secret in
formation  this was originally overlooked with unconditionally secure schemes
The most general active attack on any reactive system is shown in Figures 
and  In the more intuitive version in Figure  there is a universal quanti
er

over honest users who are inuenced by the attacker For requirements that
only specify correct outputs one can easily show that the simpler version in
Figure  where the attacker has direct access to the access points above the
correct entities is equivalent
Figure  General active attack on two correct entities in a reactive system
version with indirect access
Figure  General active attack on two correct entities in a reactive system
version with direct access
  Computational Aspects
For informationtheoretical security we simply allow the attacker with the
structure of Figure  or  to choose an arbitrary probabilistic strategy For
computational security the attacker is restricted to probabilistic polynomial
time computations
  Fullling and Error Probabilities
The fact that a scheme ful
lls a logic requirement with informationtheoretic
security without error probability is now easily de
ned The corresponding
systems in interaction with an arbitrary attacker and arbitrary users in the
structure of Figure  or  must only produce permitted sequences of interface

events
Informationtheoretic security with a speci
c small probability of error say


 is similarly straightforward ie with this probability the resulting se
quence of interface events may be wrong Note that the probabilities are taken
over all the random choices of the correct entities and the attacker strategy
Usually one does not 
x one such error probability but requires exponential
decrease in a security parameter Recall that security parameters are system
parameters and present in the initial state of each entity see Section 
If the class of attackers is computationally restricted one can usually only
require superpolynomial decrease of the error probability in a security param
eter k ie on requires that for all c   and all attackers from the given
class there exists k

  N such that for all k  k

 the error probability is less
than k
c
 There are only some diculties with general dependencies of system
parameters if more than one of them tends to in
nity
If the notion of small error probability is invariant against addition then
with two requirements their conjunction is also ful
lled so that the usual logic
calculus is sound in the resulting cryptologic semantics
 Combinations of Degrees of Security
Each requirement on a digital signature scheme can be ful
lled with a dierent
degree of security An important classi
cation criterion for signature schemes
is the degrees of security of the two requirements on disputes The following
combinations exist where dual security is a new term
  Ordinary security means that the requirement of the signer on disputes
holds computationally and that of the recipient informationtheoretically
For instance ordinary digital signature schemes and most undeniable sig
nature schemes oer this type of security Recall that the test function of
ordinary digital signature schemes is deterministic hence a recipient who
has accepted a signature is absolutely certain that any honest third party
will also accept it
  Dual security is the other way round The requirement of the signer on
disputes holds informationtheoretically and that of the recipient compu
tationally This kind of security is oered by the undeniable signature
schemes in  Note that it is now very easy to describe this degree of
security and its dierence to failstop security which it wasnt before
  Unconditional security means that both requirements on disputes hold
informationtheoretically
  Fail	stop security means that both original requirements on disputes hold
computationally and the fallback requirements from Section  are ful

lled informationtheoretically It is now easy to see that failstop security
is stronger than both ordinary and dual security By identifying the output
broken with false ie signatures are simply rejected if the computational
assumption has been broken one obtains dual security and by identifying
	
it with true ie signatures are still accepted even if the assumption has
been broken one obtains ordinary security
Note however that one also has to dierentiate whether the minimal or the
strong requirements of the signer and the recipient on disputes are considered
In particular simple versions of failstop signature schemes only guarantee the
weak requirement of the signer in both the original and the fallback version
but one can extend them so that the strong requirement of the signer is at least
guaranteed computationally
Furthermore one has to mention which of the informationtheoretic parts
have error probabilities always exponentially small It can be shown that
error probabilities cannot be avoided with the requirement of the signer on
disputes in dual and failstop security and with both requirements on disputes
in unconditional security 

 Conclusion
It has been shown that a general de
nition of signature schemes covering all
new types of them can be given by the following three parts
  Service requirements in temporal logic about the behavior of such schemes
at a user interface
  Structure mainly three programs for entities of a distributed system in
stead of the individual algorithms carried out in them
  Degree of security rather general de
nitions of what it means that a scheme
ful
lls a logic requirement in the presence of certain classes of attackers
both with access to some system parts and some inuence on honest users
in the informationtheoretic and computational sense
Based on this de
nition a systematic classi
cation of additional properties of
special types of signature schemes has been shown
Parts of this approach have only been sketched in particular the de
nitions
of schemes and degrees of security which are not special to signature schemes
and some theorems about general signature schemes They can hopefully be
presented in more detail in future work
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